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Executive Summary
The implementation of sector management 
in New England’s groundfish fishery sparked 
dramatic changes in every aspect of the industry, 
forcing an unprecedented level of innovation 
and adjustment. The switch from the effort 
controls of days-at-sea to the output controls 
of sector allocation, prompted primarily by 
federal mandates, changed everything from 
a fisherman’s pre-trip planning to business 
arrangements that get fish from the vessel to the 
table. Some fishermen are leaving the fishery, 
unable to compete in an era of tight catch limits, 
rising operational costs, and a redistribution 
of fishing privileges. Others are finding that 
the greater flexibility that sector management 
affords, with the option to lease additional 
allocation, and improved market conditions 
offer advantages over the days-at-sea system. 
The change to sectors sparked debates about 
the size and composition of the fleet, the role of 
private markets in establishing access to a public 
resource, and the adequacy of assessment science 
to set catch limits suitable to the new system. 
These debates are essential and may well lead to 
modifications in the management process. 
This paper describes the key elements of 
sector management and outlines the extent 
and scale of the change it heralds. After just 
two years of operating under sectors, the 
region’s fishing industry, fisheries managers, 
and nonprofit community have responded with 
rapid innovation. Examples abound of that new 
thinking. Meanwhile, innovation also faces 
barriers. Finally, the region’s fishing communities 
could explore new avenues for maximizing 
the benefits of the sector system. Adaptation 
and innovation are central themes, recognizing 
that sector management introduced huge new 
challenges while opening new opportunities for 
the region’s fishing communities.
1. Introduction
On May 1, 2010, New England’s groundfish fleet 
underwent a seismic shift. That date marked 
the transition from days-at-sea limits to sector 
management—an output control regulatory system 
that allocates a portion of the total annual harvest 
of cod, haddock, pollock, flounder, and other 
bottom-dwelling species to harvesting cooperatives 
called sectors. The switch from input controls to 
output controls mandated changes in every aspect 
of the industry; it requires new data collecting and 
reporting systems, monitoring protocols, fiscal and 
legal bonds among fishermen, and fishing strategies. 
Adapting to these changes has taxed the fleet’s 
ingenuity and resources. Fishermen who are able 
to invest and innovate will likely succeed under 
sectors while those who lack the resources needed 
to operate under the system will find it increasingly 
difficult to compete. 
Sector management introduces a market-based 
approach to the fishery, dividing the total allowable 
catch for each stock into allocations that can be 
traded among the sectors. The new system creates 
an internal market for fishing privileges (internal 
to the sector system since sector membership is 
restricted to those with a limited access groundfish 
permit). To augment their initial allocation, sectors 
and their members can lease or trade allocation 
from other sector fishermen. Ideally, this allows 
them to build a portfolio that balances target and 
constraining stocks.
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Figure 1. Percent of sectors’ annual catch entitlement caught 
(landed and discarded) in fishing year 2011–May, 2011 through 
April, 2012. source: NMFS
2. Setting the Stage
The reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens 
Act in 2006 (signed into law in 2007) set the 
stage for sector management by revising key 
elements of federal fisheries law. Specifically, 
the Act mandated strict rebuilding schedules 
for vulnerable stocks to be implemented 
through setting annual catch limits that are 
enforced through accountability measures. 
Regional science and statistical committees set 
these catch limits based on the best available 
science informing stock size and resiliency. 
Accountability measures are designed to ensure 
that annual harvests stay within those catch 
limits and impose additional restrictions if those 
limits are exceeded.
The New England Fishery Management 
Council (Council), the body responsible for 
setting most federal fishery regulations in the 
Northeast, decided that the days-at-sea system 
was too unwieldy, especially for incorporating 
accountability measures. The need to set days-
at-sea limits based on the most vulnerable 
stocks would likely constrain the harvest of 
abundant stocks. To make days-at-sea work 
with accountability measures, NOAA’s National 
Constraining stocks
Fishermen operating in sectors have an initial allocation 
of up to 16 stocks. The amount they have of each 
stock depends on two factors. The first is the catch 
history of that stock associated with their limited access 
multispecies permit, based on the percentage that 
their landings represented for a given stock during the 
determining period (1996 to 2006). The second is total 
allowable catch for the stock1 set by the New England 
Fishery Management Council based on advice from 
the Science and Statistical Committee. Multiplying the 
catch percentage by the total allowable catch yields the 
amount of fish a vessel brings to a sector, also known as 
its potential sector contribution.
In any given year, a vessel could end up with a high 
allocation of a stock it rarely caught if the catch limit for 
that stock dramatically increased. Conversely, a vessel 
may have been dependent on a specific stock, yielding a 
high catch percentage, but end up with a low allocation 
if the total allowable catch is small. The result can create 
imbalances in allocation relative to a vessel’s historical 
catch compositions. Stocks with low allocations can 
constrain the ability of a vessel to harvest stocks for which 
they have ample allocation. This dynamic drives many of 
the decisions fishermen now must make about the gear 
they use, areas they fish, when they fish, and how much 
additional allocation to purchase or lease.
Fishermen sometimes refer to constraining stocks as 
“choke species”. They vary somewhat from sector to 
sector, but can be identified on a fleet-wide basis from 
catch data that NOAA reports. Figure 1 shows the 
percentage of their annual catch entitlement that sector 
vessels harvested from May 1, 2011 to April 30, 2012. 
Constraining stocks are those with bars at or close to 
100%. Generally, low harvest levels represent stocks that 
being constrained by the penalties for overharvesting 
choke species.
1 Some sectors also withhold a small reserve to ensure fishermen do 
not exceed their allocation.
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Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) would have 
had to make adjustments to those limits as the 
fishing season progressed, likely spurring a race 
to fish - the tendency to maximize harvest before 
additional restrictions come into place. 
Thus, the Council sought another regulatory 
system that would comply with the tight 
deadlines and rebuilding requirements of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act and establish more 
forward-facing and predictable accountability 
measures. Sector management offered such 
a solution2. The Council avoided potential 
regulatory delays by making the system voluntary 
and allocating stocks to sectors rather than 
individuals. Had the system been mandatory 
and/or created individual quotas, it might have 
triggered the need for a region-wide referendum, 
which could not have been completed in time to 
meet federally mandated deadlines. The Council 
implemented sector management through 
Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies 
Fisheries Management Plan.
3. Key Design Elements: 
How do sectors work?
There are 16 groundfish sectors with actively 
fishing members. An additional three sectors have 
no active members—instead, they lease out their 
entire allocation. 
How a sector is formed
Any group of three or more federal groundfish 
permit holders can apply to NMFS to form a 
sector. After notifying NMFS of their intentions 
a year in advance, they must draw up by-laws, 
appoint a board and officers, and incorporate. 
Most sectors form as 501(c)(5) organizations, a 
non-profit designation for trade organizations. 
Common Pool
Fishermen are given the choice to join a sector or remain 
under the old days-at-sea system. Vessels choosing 
to remain under days-at-sea make up what is known 
as the Common Pool. This group of vessels shares an 
allocation of stocks, which is essentially the amount of 
the commercial total allowable catch left over once the 
sector allocations have been calculated. The majority of 
active vessels, accounting for approximately 98% of the 
overall allocation, are enrolled in sectors. For the most 
part, vessels choose the Common Pool because their 
owners feel they can harvest more fish under days-at-sea 
than if they join a sector. In order to ensure that Common 
Pool vessels stay within their collective allocation, NMFS 
sets trip limits for the most vulnerable species and 
drastically limits the days-at-sea available to vessels. In 
addition, NMFS can make changes to both trip limits 
and days-at-sea any time during the season, meeting 
the accountability measure requirements of Magnuson. 
These in-season adjustments create significant 
uncertainty for common pool vessels. Beginning in 2012, 
NMFS will manage the Common Pool’s allocation under 
a trimester system that spreads the annual harvest into 
four-month periods to ensure the harvest lasts the entire 
year rather than fished heavily at the start.
2 Fishermen based in Chatham, MA, formed two sectors in 2003 and 2004 
under Amendment 13 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management 
Plan. They were granted an allocation of Georges Bank cod to target 
with hook gear and gillnets. These sectors formed the model for the wider 
implementation of the concept under Amendment 16.
Meanwhile, they can recruit members and draft 
an operations plan that includes harvesting 
rules, infraction measures, a monitoring plan, 
and any requests to be exempted from specific 
regulations. All sectors are exempted from certain 
regulations, such as days-at-sea, daily, and trip 
limits. NMFS then reviews these documents 
and may approve the sector for operation, 
often pending modifications in response to 
comments. All of this must happen in time for 
NMFS to incorporate that sector’s plans into their 
environmental assessment for the coming fishing 
year, which takes several months to prepare and 
several more months to go through the federal 
rulemaking process. (Sectors’ operations plans 
are public and available at http://www.nero.noaa.
gov/sfd/SectorManagers.html under the “Other 
Resources” tab.)
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Joint and several liability
Self-enforcement is integral to sector management 
—all members are equally responsible for 
ensuring their sector does not exceed their 
annual limits. Indeed, federal regulations require 
members to be jointly and severally liable to 
each other. That provision, along with logistical 
concerns, has meant that most sectors formed 
along social or cultural lines because sector 
members need to trust each other. Thus, most 
sectors are geographically based, sometimes 
further divided by gear type or cultural ties. 
Another factor that influences sector membership 
is affiliation with an industry group. For example, 
most members of the Associated Fisheries of 
Maine, a leading industry group, joined the large 
Sustainable Harvest Sector while members of the 
Northeast Seafood Coalition likely joined one of 
the 12 sectors that NSC established3. Over time, 
sectors might realign themselves or new ones 
might form to reflect marketing strategies or to 
garner a more targeted allocation.
Annual Allocations
Each sector begins the fishing year with an 
allocation of 16 different groundfish stocks. The 
management plan includes another five stocks, 
four of which are so scarce that sectors receive no 
allocation for them and a fifth, halibut, has a one 
fish per trip limit. Sector members decide how they 
will collectively harvest that allocation and codify 
that arrangement in their harvesting rules. Most 
sectors divide their allocation among their members 
according to catch history, essentially treating it as 
individual quotas. Some sectors have begun to pool 
constraining stocks as insurance to guard against 
over-harvesting that stock, which would stop all 
sector activity until they were able to buy or trade 
quota for that stock from another sector. Most 
sectors have members who are actively fishing and 
3 These sectors now fall under an umbrella organization, the Northeast 
Sector Services Network.
Catch History and Allocation: 
Who Got What?
At the heart of the sector system lies the distribution 
of fish among the sectors. Amendment 16 stipulates 
that fish get divided based on the collective catch of 
each sectors’ members from 1996 to 20064. Thus, if a 
vessel accounted for 0.2% of Gulf of Maine cod over 
that period, then it would bring 0.2% of the annual 
total allowable catch for Gulf of Maine cod to their 
sector. While the Council discussed other alternatives, it 
ultimately decided that this catch history approach best 
represented a vessel’s long-term dependency on the 
resource. However, it does not account for changes in a 
vessel’s business operations, the movement of permits 
from one part of the region to another, or the differential 
impact that effort controls had on different ports. Not 
foreseeing the dramatic change in management, some 
fishermen invested in permits with a high number of 
days-at-sea but poor catch history—those permits 
quickly lost their value. In this way, an individual’s catch 
history may not always reflect historic participation in the 
groundfish fishery. 
Key to the success of sector management is the ability 
to trade or lease allocation. This allows sector members 
flexibility to acquire a portfolio of stocks that best 
represents their fishing businesses. Members may trade 
or lease their allocation among themselves or with 
members of other sectors. Sometimes fishermen make 
these arrangements themselves and sometimes they 
may ask their sector manager to do it for them. All trades 
outside the sector go through the sector manager and 
are reported to NMFS, which approves the trade if the 
sectors have enough allocation to cover the deal. Trades 
that happen within a sector are not reported to NMFS 
until the sectors’ year-end report.
4 The exception to this history is to the Fixed Gear Sector, 
whose history for GB cod was originally set from 1991-2001 in 
Amendment 13 and was upheld in Amendment 16.
Sector Management in New England’s Groundfish Fishery: Dramatic Change Spurs Innovation 5
others who decide not to fish for groundfish, leasing 
out their entire allocation instead. 
The sector manager
Each sector employs a full- or part-time sector 
manager. Some managers work for more than 
one sector. The sector manager’s job varies from 
sector to sector, but has three basic components: 
tracking and reporting the sector’s landings, 
discards, and trades on a weekly basis; keeping 
track of the internal division of allocation and 
catch; and overseeing the trade of allocation with 
other sectors. Some managers take on additional 
duties, such as overseeing the sector’s finances. 
Some sectors have subcontracted the tracking 
and reporting task to a third party. In all cases 
the sector manager is hired by and reports to the 
sector’s board of directors.
Catch accounting and reporting
A sector must demonstrate to NMFS that it is 
staying within its allocation for all stocks. Each 
week, sector managers file a report to NMFS 
that shows the beginning allocation available, 
what was landed, what was discarded, and what 
was traded in or out of the sector (see Figure 
2). Sector managers rely on two sources of 
data to determine what their members landed: 
mandatory weekly reports from seafood dealers 
that provide total landed weight by species and 
the vessel trip reports that document where the 
fish were caught to differentiate between stock 
areas (for example, Gulf of Maine cod versus 
Georges Bank cod) and the type of gear used. 
Discarded fish, those below the legal size of a 
species, must then be subtracted from the landed 
amounts because those fish count against a 
sector’s allocation5. NMFS provides discard data 
derived from on-board observers and monitors. 
NMFS also calculates an assumed discard rate 
that applies to trips that do not carry an on-board 
monitor. Finally, managers account for any fish 
traded in or out of the sector over the past week.
5 Under sector management, vessels must bring all legally sized fish to the dock.
Figure 2. Weekly Allocation Accounting
Monitoring
In Amendment 16, the Council envisioned 
two types of monitoring—dockside and at-
sea. Dockside monitoring was designed to 
verify the dealer reports (and therefore landed 
catch) with a third-party monitor witnessing a 
vessel’s off-load to ensure weights and species 
were accurately recorded. At-sea monitoring 
produces discard rates and verifies catch and 
area fished. Amendment 16 stipulates that 
industry assume the costs of monitoring, but 
NMFS provided grants to cover sectors’ dockside 
monitoring expenses during the start-up phase 
of the new sector system. NMFS suspended 
dockside monitoring in mid-September, 2011 
after deciding it was not a good use of funds. 
In addition, NMFS has run and funded at-
sea monitoring through its observer program, 
pledging to continue funding at-sea monitoring 
through April, 2013. 
When federal support for monitoring is no longer 
available, the industry will face a substantial new 
cost. Dockside monitoring costs were inversely 
proportional to the size of a vessel’s offload—
costs ranged from about a half cent per pound 
for the largest landings to close to two cents per 
pound for smaller ones. Some very small trips 
landed in remote ports were even costlier. Unless 
the Council adjusts Amendment 16, dockside 
monitoring will resume in 2013 at 20% coverage 
of vessel arrivals.
At-sea monitoring is much more expensive, 
ranging from $550 to $700 a day. NMFS has 
aimed to cover 38% of groundfish trips with an 
observer or monitor in 2010 and 2011 and is 
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lowering its target to 25% for 2012. Even at that 
level, many vessels will be hard pressed to absorb 
this additional cost. Since discard rates vary by 
sector, gear type, and fishing grounds, monitors 
must be deployed to ensure adequate coverage 
levels for each combination within a sector to 
attain a Council-mandated level of statistical 
confidence. NMFS remains committed to its 
observing program, which covers 8% of trips to 
collect scientific data. Industry will be responsible 
for the remaining 17% coverage. 
4. How industry has 
responded
In April of 2011, the Gulf of Maine Research 
Institute (GMRI) conducted a survey of groundfish 
permit holders to gain a better understanding 
of how fishermen have adjusted to sector 
management6. The survey revealed a wide range 
of changes. The most publicized of which was 
the number of fishermen who dropped out either 
permanently (by selling their permit and vessel) or 
temporarily (by leasing out all of their allocation) 
because they felt their portion of the sector’s annual 
allocation was not enough to remain profitable (see 
the graph on page 10 showing the decline in active 
groundfish vessels over the past decade). 
Focusing exclusively on fleet consolidation misses 
the profound changes that took place among the 
majority of vessels that remained active. Indeed, 
fishermen have adapted to sector management 
with wholesale changes throughout their entire 
operations, from the number of trips they make to 
the influence they wield in the marketplace.
More selective gear
Sector management puts an added premium 
on targeting legally sized fish since undersized 
fish count against the sector’s allocation but 
cannot be sold. Additionally, employing selective 
fishing gear may allow a vessel to optimize 
its allocation and avoid being shut down by 
reaching its limit on a constraining stock. In 
response, captains starting using nets with larger 
mesh to let out undersized fish. Meanwhile, 
more vessels developed and utilized nets that 
avoid constraining stocks. For example, the low 
allocations of cod lead more boats to use the 
“separator trawl” that targets haddock while 
avoiding cod or the “topless trawl” that yields 
more flounder than cod. 
Weight-watching
Worried that a single tow might yield more of a 
stock than they have allocation to cover, some 
fishermen started using catch sensors that clip to 
the codend (the tail end of a trawl net where the 
fish collect) and signal the wheelhouse when the 
catch reaches a pre-set weight of fish. Similarly, 
many skippers are making much shorter tows to 
keep a closer eye on the amount of fish coming 
over the rail.
Managing allocation
Although most sectors treated their collective 
allocation as individual quotas, some sectors 
blurred the lines by swapping allocation around 
to suit each fisherman’s business. Thus, two 
fishermen might simply trade stocks so that 
each ends up with a mix of species they had 
traditionally targeted, regardless of whether one 
stock is worth more at the dock than the other. In 
cases where difference in market value is extreme, 
some money might change hands as well.
Most fishermen lease and trade allocation to 
keep fishing. The lease price for allocation 
tends to follow market price and reflect the 
relative abundance of that stock. Therefore cod, 
which has a high dock price as well as being 
a constraining stock for many vessels, is quite 
expensive—meaning its leasing price is close to 
the dock price for landed fish. Other stocks (e.g. 
pollock) that are more abundant and fetch lower 
prices at the dock are significantly cheaper to 
lease. Some owners may decide that it is worth 
buying constraining stocks at a relatively high 6 Full survey results available on GMRI website at http://www.gmri.org/community/fisheries.asp.
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price if it means they can harvest more of their 
allocation of other, more abundant fish. The 
financial decisions under sector management 
have become more complicated.
Most fishermen report that leasing allocation 
under sector management is relatively more 
expensive than leasing days-at-sea was under 
the old system. The exception is owners of large 
vessels. Large vessels (over 75 feet) were limited 
to a small pool of days-at-sea that matched their 
vessel’s length and horsepower. Under the days-
at-sea system, smaller vessels could buy days 
from larger ones, but not the other way around. 
The reasoning was that a large vessel could land 
more fish per day than a smaller one. Under 
sector management, it no longer matters what 
size vessel is landing fish, so allocation can be 
traded among all vessel sizes, and gear types, 
expanding the pool of available allocation for the 
largest boats. 
Marketing contracts
Traditionally, groundfish landed in New England 
passes through auction houses or other dealers 
with prices varying daily, driven largely by the 
amount of a given species landed that day. Under 
sectors, however, fishermen have greater control 
over their supply of fish because they hold a 
pre-defined portion of the overall harvest. Some 
fishermen have responded by entering into 
forward contracts with processors or retailers to 
supply a given amount of fish for a certain price, 
adding stability for both sides. 
Fishermen need to be careful, however, not to run 
afoul of anti-trust laws, which may come into play 
if two or more enter a contract together. GMRI 
and the Northeast Sector Services Network hired 
a legal team to draft a white paper as guidance for 
sectors. That paper is available on GMRI’s website 
at www.gmri.org/sectorresources.
Processors—companies that purchase fish from 
dealers or auctions and prepare them for market—
have changed their business models to adapt to 
the new system. Many are seeking contracts with 
harvesters to generate more predictable supplies. 
Large chain restaurants, cruise ship companies, 
and multi-state retailers comprise the bulk of 
the seafood market. They want a steady supply 
so they can streamline their menus or advertise 
specials well in advance. Processors often take 
huge risks when negotiating such deals, having 
to fulfill orders by purchasing fish on the global 
marketplace. Negotiating contracts directly with 
harvesters can help reduce those risks, allowing 
them to pay more at the dock. Some processors 
want to reduce their risk further by switching to a 
contract-production model. Under that system, a 
processor would not own the fish they prepare for 
market. Instead, a retailer would purchase directly 
from a harvester, dealer, or auction and either the 
buyer or seller would contract the processor to 
process the fish.
Lawsuits
The groundfish industry has not responded solely 
with modifications to its businesses. Fishermen 
and fishing communities have banded together 
to challenge core components of Amendment 16 
in the courts. Citing possible conflicts with the 
National Standards7, the suit seeks to overturn 
Amendment 16. The plaintiffs claim a gross 
injustice in how catch history was determined for 
the initial allocation. Specifically, the catch period 
for one sector was slightly different for one stock 
and the recreational catch was determined using 
a different time period than for the commercial 
fleet. In July of 2011, the court upheld the sector 
system; however a promised appeal will keep the 
issue in the courts for some time to come. 
5. How NOAA Fisheries has 
responded
Amendment 16’s monumental change did not affect 
just the fishing industry. It brought commensurate 
change to the regulatory process as well. 
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Data management systems
NMFS staff from both the Northeast Regional 
Office in Gloucester and the Northeast Fishery 
Science Center in Woods Hole hosted a string of 
workshops before Amendment 16 took effect. These 
sessions were designed to gather industry input into 
how data should flow and to ensure that sectors 
develop data systems that met federal reporting 
requirements, such as the weekly sector reports.
NMFS also facilitated sector reporting by 
establishing a new website called the Sector 
Information Management Module that provides 
sectors with the dealer reports and discard data 
they need to submit their weekly reports. Sector 
managers use the website to submit their reports 
and post allocation trade requests, which NMFS 
must then approve based on the availability of 
allocation from the supplying sector. 
Discard estimation
When a vessel has an observer or monitor on 
board, that trip gets assigned an actual discard 
rate. But the majority of trips are not observed 
or monitored, so NMFS assigns assumed discard 
rates derived from trips that have been observed. 
These sector-level assumed rates reflect the 
vessel’s sector, gear type, and fishing location. 
For example, all vessels in a given sector that fish 
with gillnets in the southern New England area 
get the same discard rate. 
Financial support for dockside 
monitoring and sector operations
Responding to concerns from industry that the 
transition to sector management would be costly, 
NMFS has made millions of dollars available 
for sectors. Some of these funds came from two 
pass-through grants made to GMRI as a cost-
effective way to disburse federal support quickly. 
A total of $1.8 million was made available to 
cover dockside monitoring costs. Working with 
industry, GMRI developed a system for equitably 
distributing monitoring funds, accounting for 
the diverse range of sectors, landing ports, and 
amount of allocation. NMFS committed a further 
$1 million for sector start-up costs. When it 
suspended funding for dockside monitoring, 
NMFS redirected the roughly $1 million of 
unspent funds to sector operational costs. Funds 
for sector operations were distributed evenly 
among all sectors, recognizing that all sectors face 
similar fixed costs.
Collaborative research
In 2010, NMFS directed most of the region’s 
collaborative research funding towards projects 
that would help industry adjust to sectors. 
One such project is GEARNET, a network of 
fishermen and scientists. The project solicited 
ideas from each sector and the common pool, 
funding 17 in all. As a result, these fishermen 
are testing new nets, catch sensors, and mammal 
deterrents. More information about GEARNET 
can be found at www.gearnet.org.
6. How nonprofits and 
philanthropies responded
Technical assistance
Nonprofits and industry associations throughout 
the region, including Cape Cod Commercial 
Hook Fishermen’s Association, Penobscot 
East Resource Center, the Island Institute, 
EarthJustice, the Associated Fisheries of Maine, 
the Northeast Seafood Coalition, and GMRI 
moved to provide technical support to the 
groundfish industry during the transition to 
sectors. The sheer complexity of forming a sector 
necessitated outside assistance. Given all the 
demands on their time and resources, a small 
group of fishermen would have been hard pressed 
to prepare the hundreds of pages of documents, 
including a highly technical environmental 
assessment, needed to gain NMFS approval. 
Environmental Defense Fund also worked 
7 The Magnuson Act lays out 8 National Standards that should guide the 
development of FMPs. The standards can be found here: http://www.nmfs.noaa.
gov/sfa/domes_fish/national_standard.htm.
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to bring successful models to New England 
from outside the region. These efforts gained 
the support of several major foundations that 
wanted New England’s sector model to succeed.
Permit Banks
Other nonprofits, notably the Cape Cod Fisheries 
Trust, the Gloucester Fishing Community 
Preservation Fund, and The Nature Conservancy, 
support the industry with permit banks (though 
Cape Cod’s and Gloucester’s pre-date sector 
management). Each permit bank has a different 
emphasis, but they all offer fishing businesses 
a way to augment their allocation with below-
market leases. The Nature Conservancy has used 
its permits to support conservation engineering 
research to test more selective and fuel efficient 
gear. Permit banks also exist to support fishermen 
in Boston and on Boston’s South Shore—these, 
too, pre-date sectors.
Congress directed roughly $5 million to Maine, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire to establish 
permit banks. Through a memorandum of 
understanding with NMFS, the state permit banks 
focus on making allocation available to smaller 
vessels (45 feet or less) from small communities. 
Maine, which received a total of $3 million for 
its permit bank, has established its own lease-
only sector. New Hampshire is planning to put its 
permits in with the two sectors based in that state. 
Massachusetts has opted to create a revolving loan 
fund rather than a permit bank to assist fishermen 
to buy new gear or lease allocation. 
Research
In addition to the GEARNET projects, research 
institutions in the region, including the 
University of Massachusetts School of Marine 
Science and Technology, the University of 
New Hampshire Cooperative Extension, the 
Commercial Fisheries Research Foundation in 
Rhode Island, and GMRI have focused research 
projects on sector needs. This work includes 
economic and social analysis, gear development, 
by-catch avoidance, fuel conservation, and fish 
handling techniques. 
Marketing
With its market-based approach to environmental 
issues, Environmental Defense Fund has been a 
proponent of catch shares and continues to search 
for ways that industry can improve profitability 
under sector management. To that end, they 
sponsored a workshop in February, 2011, that 
brought fishermen, processors, and retailers 
together to explore new marketing opportunities. 
With fishermen holding an allocation of fish, they 
can treat that allocation as an inventory from which 
to draw over the course of the year. Likewise, 
processors and retailers have a better sense of 
what supply might be available and can structure 
contracts or promotions based on that information. 
Lawsuits
Several industry-based nonprofits joined the 
lawsuit challenging Amendment 16 for being 
too restrictive on industry. Another nonprofit, 
Oceana, brought a lawsuit against NOAA arguing 
that the amendment did not go far enough to 
account for the new system’s impact on some 
marine mammals, by-catch, discards, and highly 
vulnerable stocks. At the end of 2011, the District 
of Columbia Federal District Court ruled largely 
in favor of NOAA, but agreed with Oceana 
that the Amendment did not create suitable 
accountability measures for five severely depleted 
stocks8.
7. Limits to adaptation
Although industry, NMFS, and nonprofits 
are quickly adapting to the new system with 
innovation and ingenuity, there are limits to the 
speed and depth of adaption. One constraint is 
the sheer enormity of the change. Fishermen 
have had to adapt to so many new regulatory 
requirements that many have not been able to 
make additional adjustments that could provide 
added benefits, such as forward contracts. 
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Another constraint is the availability of capital–
change is expensive and making investments in 
new gear or additional allocation is beyond the 
means of many vessel owners.
More than ever, fishermen must be shrewd 
entrepreneurs, not just successful harvesters. 
Sector management adds a new dimension to 
their businesses—managing allocation—and 
new demands for investment—purchasing 
additional allocation and/or more selective gear, 
all against the backdrop of increasing vessel safety 
regulations and an aging fleet of vessels. Many 
fishermen also serve on their sector’s boards. 
As a result, they are spending increasing time 
in meetings working through the business of 
running sectors and learning the ins and outs of 
nonprofit management.
The stock-specific relationship between 
investment and return forms the underpinning of 
the market incentives that drive this new system. 
Through the basic laws of supply and demand, 
this market-based approach makes it relatively 
more expensive to harvest stocks with low catch 
limits than stocks with higher limits. The effect 
should be to push fishing effort to more abundant 
stocks. However, that effect is somewhat 
dampened by price increases for scarce but 
desirable products and by constraints to changing 
fishing practices. The seafood market is global 
in scope, so a relative scarcity in New England 
does not necessarily yield a higher price, which 
would help offset lower catches. The global 
nature of fisheries also means that New England 
fishermen risk loosing market share permanently 
if wholesalers can find a more predictable source 
elsewhere, such as Norwegian haddock.
The increased costs associated with transitioning 
to sectors hit industry at the same time that 
catch limits were decreasing on many key stocks, 
as mandated by tight rebuilding periods in the 
Magnuson-Stevens Act. Between 2009 and 2010, 
catch targets on 12 groundfish stocks declined, 
some by as much as half. For example, the 2010 
catch limit for Gulf of Maine cod, a key stock 
for many smaller boats, was 60% less than the 
2009 catch target. (Under days-at sea, the overall 
limit was called a catch target while under sector 
management, it is called a catch limit). As a 
result, many vessels saw their revenue decline 
from 2009 to 2010. The decrease was partly offset 
by higher market prices, but not entirely. 
A major obstacle for many boats was the effect of 
the allocation formula used to distribute the catch 
limits among sectors. Some fishermen found 
themselves with low initial allocations, forcing 
them either to lease in more allocation, lease 
theirs out and concentrate on other fisheries, or 
sell their permit and leave the fishery all together. 
It is impossible to tell what spurred individual 
decisions, as the fleet was already contracting 
under days-at-sea, but Figure 3 shows NMFS data 
on the number of vessels undertaking at least one 
groundfish trip.
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Figure 3. Number of Active Groundfish Vessels, 2001 to 2011.
8. Areas ripe for innovation
Managing a sector
Currently, most sectors follow the same model: 
a full- or part-time sector manager conducts 
the bulk of the sector’s business - tracking 
catch, executing trades, reporting to NMFS, and 
interacting with the board of directors. Federal 
assistance, over $3 million in total, has been 
crucial for this initial start-up phase. But as that 8 Atlantic wolfish, ocean pout, Southern New England/Mid-Atlantic Winter 
flounder, Southern and Northern windowpane flounder, and Halibut.
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assistance fades out, sectors will need to develop 
lower cost models for managing their businesses. 
The New England Sector Services Network, an 
off-shoot of the Northeast Seafood Coalition, 
offers one model for centralizing certain sector 
tasks, such as the annual application process, and 
frees up sector managers to focus on marketing 
or optimizing allocation. Another model is for 
sectors to share or subcontract the intricate 
catch reporting tasks. Additionally, sectors will 
have to take a close look at the seasonality of 
their groundfish activity and the premium they 
might be paying for keeping their membership 
small. Some sectors may either have to merge or 
concentrate their fishing activity to a few months 
to limit their need for a manager. 
Sector composition
Because many sectors formed initially along 
geographic and social lines, they were not 
necessarily developed with an eye toward the mix 
of allocation that their members might bring, nor 
their fishing philosophy or marketing aspirations. 
Some harvesters may find benefit from forming 
sectors to create a specific mix of allocation, join 
with others using selective gear so they reduce 
their discard rate, or align along sustainable 
marketing strategies. 
Cost and effectiveness 
of monitoring
Monitoring sectors potentially involves both 
dockside and at-sea monitors to verify the 
now-critical catch, discards, and stock data. 
New monitoring requirements place additional 
demands on industry’s financial resources, as well 
as introducing safety and logistical concerns. The 
traditional approach to at-sea monitoring that 
relies on a human observer will be too expensive 
for many fishing businesses once federal funding 
ceases. New approaches, such as using video 
cameras, hold promise but still face cost and 
logistical hurdles. 
Size and composition of the fleet 
The introduction of sector management has reignited 
debate within industry about how many boats should be 
fishing and what is the right balance between smaller, 
in-shore vessels and larger, off-shore vessels. The many 
changes highlighted thus far have dramatically changed 
the commercial groundfish landscape. The result will 
certainly be a restructuring of the fleet. Amendment 16 
places no cap on permit or allocation ownership, either 
by an individual or a sector. Attempts to add those to the 
fishery management plan are ongoing, but very difficult 
to institute. 
Short of a major overhaul of the permitting system, market 
forces will ultimately shape the size and composition 
of the fleet. Smaller vessels, with lower margins, might 
find new, more localized markets to get a premium 
for their fish, much like local farmers throughout New 
England. An added undercurrent is the gradual aging 
of the fleet. Many of the vessels operating today date 
to the 1970s. Replacing those vessels is expensive – 
particularly because new Coast Guard regulations have 
improved safety but added cost. As fishermen upgrade 
their vessels, they will face six- and seven-figure prices 
for new boats. Financing capacity and risk tolerance will 
likely reshape the fleet toward consolidation and more 
business-focused management.
Higher yields of annual catch limits
Despite the economic hardship faced by many 
during the first year of sector management, 
the fleet as a whole did not catch more than 
85% of any allocated stock. While some sectors 
did harvest 100% of a few of their allocations, 
industry will be looking to increase their harvest 
levels as much as possible. Part of the solution 
to increasing yields may be to reconsider closed 
areas; many fishermen contend that closed 
areas constrain their ability to stay on schools 
of haddock or pollock. Increased use of more 
selective gear, bait, and fishing practices may also 
help sectors harvest more of their allocations. 
Finally, sector members may find benefit from 
planning their activities around their sector’s total 
allocation rather than treating each member’s 
allocation as an individual quota. 
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Price stabilization
The change to sector management has the 
potential to bring significant change to the way 
catch is sold and, therefore, the price fishermen 
receive. Fishing against an annual allocation 
allows the fishermen more control over their 
effort and the ability to time their activity to 
general market trends. In addition, sectors 
introduce the opportunity for vessels to contract 
more directly with retailers by entering into 
longer-term contracts for a certain amount of fish 
for a set price. In a world ruled by uncertainty, 
the thought of a more stable price holds great 
appeal for many fishermen, just as a more stable 
supply, even at a premium, holds appeal to 
supermarkets and restaurants.
Traceability
While not directly linked to sectors or catch 
shares, the ability to trace a seafood product from 
its point of harvest through processing to the 
retailer can strengthen the connection between 
harvester and consumer. With the increased 
interest in local, sustainable foods, demonstrating 
those connections is critical for reassuring the 
public about the authenticity of its seafood. 
Traceability can mean several things, but at its 
core, it is the ability to trace the origin of a product 
through the various transactions that bring it 
from its source (in this case, a fishing vessel) to 
its consumer. Seafood typically changes hands 
multiple times as it gets landed, auctioned off, 
transported to a processor, processed into fillets 
or other products, sold to a distributor, and finally 
conveyed to a retail venue such as a grocery store 
or restaurant. Steps along the way may be skipped 
if, for example, chefs buy directly from a vessel 
or fish are sold through a community-supported 
fishery. Regardless of the number of steps, tracing 
a product’s origin back to a specific vessel (or 
even specific fishing ground) adds value—and 
accountability—especially if it also allows a retailer 
to tell a story about that origin.
Assessment science
The 2006 reauthorization of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act draws a clear distinction around 
using the best available science to set catch 
limits. Councils may not set catch limits above 
fishing levels set by their Science and Statistical 
Committees. In addition, the switch to an output-
based management system places a new emphasis 
on assessment science. Not only are absolute 
numbers of each stock important, but their 
abundance relative to each other becomes critical. 
Assessments for the majority of stocks might be 
accurate, but if the assessment for a constraining 
stock is too low, it impacts industry’s ability to 
harvest all other stocks as well.
The need to create stock-by-stock catch limits 
that are tied to strict accountability measures has 
pushed the limits of current assessment science. 
The current cycle of assessments every three 
years may not be frequent enough to capture 
changes in the ecosystem and our understanding 
of population structure may not be refined 
enough to explain changes in abundance and 
geographic distributions. Gulf of Maine cod and 
Georges Bank yellowtail flounder serve as two 
examples of stocks whose recent assessments 
Sustainability and the Marketplace
Holding allocation at the vessel or sector level creates new 
opportunities for fishermen to distinguish themselves 
in the marketplace. One of the tenets of quota-based 
fishery management is that it grants participating vessels 
a greater sense of ownership over their portion of the 
overall catch. Fishermen have always been stewards of 
the resource, but if that resource is held in common, the 
actions of individual fishermen get lost in the collective 
activity of the entire fleet. Having a set amount of fish to 
harvest - with the possibility of purchasing more - creates 
a system more analogous to manufacturers holding an 
inventory of product. Investments made in gear that 
reduces its impact on habitat or requires less fuel not 
only reduce operating costs, but also yield higher prices 
by responding to the increased market demand for 
sustainably sourced food. 
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differed dramatically from estimates made just 
three years ago.
The planned move to an ecosystem-based 
approach to managing fisheries will place even 
more demands on the scientific community. 
Managing the fishery at the ecosystem level 
rather than the stock level will likely require 
aggregating stocks into larger family groups 
(such as all gadids—cod, pollock, and haddock) 
and unifying the broad management areas to 
include all stocks (currently, different stocks 
are managed with different stock boundaries). 
The increased complexity of understanding 
and accounting for interactions across stocks 
will present a huge challenge for scientists. 
Translating that complexity into an equitable and 
efficient management system will prove equally 
challenging for managers.
9. Conclusion
Sector management has changed the legal, 
economic, and cultural landscape for New 
England’s groundfish industry, resulting in 
monumental changes to historical fishing 
practices and a way of life. The fishing industry 
has responded with everything from tinkering 
with their fishing gear to complex marketing 
agreements that help stabilize price to lawsuits 
seeking to halt sector management altogether. 
As sectors take hold acute challenge are 
emerging: uncertainty in stock assessments, 
data management constraints, monitoring costs, 
and the increasing need for capital to compete 
effectively. Overcoming those challenges will 
require individual and collective innovations of all 
stripes—technical, social, economic, and political. 
Much innovation has occurred already. But many 
questions remain: 
• how does industry survive the impending 
era of drastically reduced catch limits on 
key stocks such as the 22% drop in Gulf 
of Maine cod for 2012 (and a much larger 
drop anticipated for 2013)? 
• can assessment science improve to provide 
more timely and accurate catch limits? 
• how do smaller vessels with limited access 
to capital compete in a system that requires 
higher investments?
• can the cooperative nature of sectors allow 
their members to capitalize on a shared 
allocation to grow profitability?
• can the system both reward innovative 
owners who invest wisely while 
maintaining opportunity for new businesses 
or isolated communities? and 
• what lies ahead as the nation moves 
toward management systems that reflect 
the complex interactions of the marine 
ecosystem rather than treating individual 
stocks in isolation?
The answers to these questions lie along a spectrum 
of individual entrepreneurship through democratic 
political engagement in the Council process. Sector 
management now defines the arena in which these 
questions will be answered for the groundfish 
fishery. As industry members, managers, scientists, 
and the public grapple with the dramatic changes 
the new system has created, they will need to work 
together to overcome remaining obstacles to success 
while capitalizing on the opportunities that sector 
management offers. 
